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Rosenthal 1
Introduction
“They are looking for information and guidance and want to know what to do. They are
not looking for rumors.” This was part of reporter Philip Rucker’s response as he questioned the
report done by the Department of Homeland Security which suggested the new coronavirus could
be suppressed by heat and humidity. Trump replied: “Hey Phil, I’m the president and you’re fake
news. And you know what I’ll say to you? I know you well, I know you well. Because I know the
guy, I see what he writes. He’s a total faker.”
In the same press conference, Trump was asked by another reporter if he was aware of the
medical status of Kim Jong-un. Trump replied: “I think the report was incorrect. I think the report
was done by a network that was incorrect. I'm hearing they used old documents...I hope it was an
incorrect report.” When a CNN reporter followed up asking if Trump had been in contact with the
North Koreans, he again refused to answer, spoke on the strength of his and Kim’s relationship,
and ended with: “I think it was a fake report, done by CNN.” The same CNN reporter responded
with: “But can I ask you a question?” To which Trump replied: “No, that’s enough.” The same
reporter stated: “But that wasn’t my question…” Trump responded: “The problem is you don't
write the truth, you know, as far as I am concerned I want to go to the next one.” The reporter
continued pressing Trump, asking a follow up question, to which Trump ended by saying: “CNN
is fake news, don’t talk to me.”1
If you have Twitter, watch or read the news, or even listen to a conversation on the street,
you would know that a tendency has developed to deem particular facts, ideas, people, and

PBS NewsHour, WATCH: White House coronavirus task force gives pandemic update -- April 23,
2020 (YouTube: April 23, 2020).
1
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networks as “fake news.” What I find most interesting about this is not just the compulsion to label
something as “fake,” but the underlying commitment to truth, certainty and the skeptical attitude
that this proclamation makes clear. While one surely could claim something “fake” after it has been
submitted to substantial questioning and investigation, the majority of “fake news” claims lack
substantiation of any kind. “Fake news” rhetoric has morphed into a tool that can be implemented
toward ideas, opinions and facts that one personally, not objectively, disagrees with. This political
declaration of truth-knowing is dangerous for it not only uncritically assumes a position of absolute
certainty, but it also precludes conversation and debate which might lead toward actual certainty.
While the prevalence of “fake news” might appear to be a new phenomenon, it actually
speaks to an important relationship between skepticism and certainty which has a rich
philosophical history. As we see with the above example, this relationship - and its political
implications - is one that still haunts us, and as such, demands further attention. Does a
commitment to certainty necessarily call for a skeptical attitude? What are the political
consequences of skepticism? How might we understand traditional political positions - from
revolutionary politics to reformism, liberalism to conservatism - as motivated by the quest for
certainty, as informed by a skeptical epistemology? To answer these questions, I turn to the work of
René Descartes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Edmund Burke.
My first chapter focuses on René Descartes, who obliterates the old way of approaching
philosophy. Instead of relying on the learning and application of forms to understand the world, he
asserts that we no longer need prior knowledge; we simply need to enact our equal capacity to
reason through using our mind. Due to the certainty of our capacity to reason, he establishes a
method which requires skepticism in order to develop certainty. His method while demonstrating
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the importance of doubt, still forces us to consider what certainty means both individually and
collectively, and in doing so, raises many political questions. I argue that his method illuminates
two political tendencies: revolution and conservatism.
In my second chapter, I examine Jean-Jacques Rousseau who was worshiped like a God
during the French Revolution. However, through investigating his work, I suggest that a tension
emerges between the content of his ideas, which seem to be revolutionary through and through,
and their implementation, which speaks to more conservative trends. Ultimately, I argue that this
tension is driven by two different motivations: the first being to establish equality and the second
being the productive necessity of inequality.
In my third chapter, I investigate Edmund Burke, who is considered to have founded
conservatism. I claim Burke’s thought is often simplified, but through examining his skepticism, we
can bring forth its complexities. I argue that Burke’s skepticism leads him to rely on the concept of
inheritance, resulting in a political ideology that opposes revolution, but still prioritizes reform. As
such, I argue that he is fundamentally interested in the question of change and that his criticism of
the French Revolution had little to do with the changes they wished to implement, but had
everything to do with the manner in which it was done.
Throughout this project, I aim to show that the relationship between skepticism and
certainty is a philosophically prosperous one. Not only does it bring attention to the complexity of
these thinkers and the nuance of their political positions, but it also reveals that skepticism is a
narrative in progress which brings forth vastly different political outcomes and questions.
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1
Descartes’ Politics: From the Individual to the Collective
Prior to Descartes, the dominant epistemological school of thought was the Aristotelian
school.2 It was thought that an individual was only able to make sense of the world around them
through the application of set principles, that is, until Descartes. He found this approach of
understanding to be utterly problematic, for it carried a tremendous capacity to bring about false
certainties. So, instead of adhering to these false principles, Descartes took it upon himself to
discover a new way in which we can know with absolute certainty. A feat in which he
accomplished:
And after having thus reconstructed the edifice which it pleased him to pull down,
he will loudly and boldly declare it indestructible. Doubt no more in God, nor the
soul, nor the real world; Descartes has found the principle of certainty, and the
notions he has deduced from it he now assures us are as certain as geometrical
theorems. He has abandoned doubt; but he has exhausted, he has conquered it; he
has seized upon the right of examination for his own use, but he has disarmed it.
For a moment a revolutionist in philosophy, he appears to have had the pretension
to close the gate on revolutions for ever. Yesterday he doubts, to-day he imposes
himself.3
Descartes “found the principle of certainty” through having “exhausted” and “conquered” doubt.
He declares that certainty is a direct function of the mind, and that through the utilization of reason
alone, we can decipher the world around us. He is so sure of his new edifice, that the man who
once doubted everything, doubts no longer, and instead “imposes himself.”

Joseph Pitt, "Problematics in the History of Philosophy," Synthese 92, no. 1 (1992), 123.
Louis Blanc, History of the French Revolution of 1789, Vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Lea &
Blanchard,1848), 217.
2

3
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Despite Descartes’ assertion of certainty, he received tremendous criticism for his new
approach.4 Some questioned his indoctrination of God, claiming that his method was created solely
to prove the existence of God. Alternatively, Descartes was also called an atheist because he dared
to question God’s existence altogether. Figures such as David Hume argued that Descartes’ focus
on the cogito was wrong, and that the senses and the body are important and should not be so
easily dismissed.5 Descartes’ ideas regarding space and time were also scrutinized and later
disproved by Sir Isaac Newton through his discovery of gravity, but it should be noted that he
spent considerable energy in order to disprove Descartes.6
Despite Descartes’ critics, his work demonstrates the importance of doubt and still forces us
to consider what certainty means both individually and collectively, and in doing so, raises many
political questions. I argue that his method - one which requires skepticism aimed at the
development of certainty - illuminates two political tendencies: revolution and conservatism.
He boldly begins his Discourse on Method by stating all men are inherently equal in their
ability to reason:
Rather, it provides evidence that the power of judging well and of distinguishing the
true from the false (which is, properly speaking, what people call “good sense” or
“reason”) is naturally equal in all men, and that the diversity of our opinions does
not arise from the fact that some people are more reasonable than others, but solely
from the fact that we lead our thoughts along different paths and do not take the
same things into consideration.7

Descartes et al., The Harvard Classics, vol. 34: French and English Philosophers (Descartes,
Rousseau, Voltaire, Hobbes), ed. Charles William Eliot, (P. F. Collier & Son, 1910), 115.
5
Pitt, “Problematics,” 125-126.
6
Andrew Janiak, "Newton’s Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward
Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab: Stanford University, Winter 2019), section 3.
7
René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy (Fourth Edition),
trans. Donald Cress (Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett, 1998), 1.
4
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While this diversity of thought had been considered to reflect an inherent unequal ability to reason,
Descartes claims it reflects the opposite. Due to our equal capacity to reason, he argues that we
arrive at different conclusions “solely” because we do not take “the same things into
consideration.” Had we followed the same “paths,” we would arrive at the same end.
Diversity of thought, while reflecting an equal capacity to reason, also forced Descartes to
investigate what it means to be certain:
I noticed there was about as much diversity as I had previously found among the
opinions of philosophers. Thus the greatest profit I derived from this was that, on
seeing many things that, although they seem to us very extravagant and ridiculous,
do not cease to be commonly accepted and approved among other great peoples, I
learned not to believe anything too firmly of which I had been persuaded only be
example and custom; and this I little by little freed myself from many errors that can
darken our natural light and render us less able to listen to reason.8
Through travel, he realized that many things he would find to be peculiar in one place would be
“accepted and approved” in another. Witnessing diversity - the rejection of one practice or custom
here, but the acceptance of that same practice or custom there - forced Descartes to question what
he had previously accepted to be true. Diversity revealed the blind acceptance of culturally relative
ideas and customs, which he himself fell victim to by virtue of living in society. Traveling outside
of his country forced him to recognize this diversity which, in turn, directed him to question his
own beliefs: “I learned not to believe anything too firmly of which I had been persuaded only by
example and custom.” This self-driven reflection is a direct result of the recognition of diversity
through experience. Experience taught him to be skeptical in order to cast aside the errors he
accumulated while living and learning in society.

8

René Descartes, Discourse, 6.
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Experience offers significant insight because it reveals the lack of concrete truths while
highlighting what is not known. However, if experience reveals so much, how is it that Descartes
can then claim that “studying within [himself]” (solitude), proved to be much more successful
“than had [he] never left either [his] country or [his] books.”9 This feeling of having greater success
through solitude speaks to the confusion Descartes discovered in the world. Diversity of opinion
clouds the use of one's reason. Solitude contains freedom from society, and by virtue, freedom
from confusion. If we conceptualize Descartes in this way, the significance of solitude is evident solitude is where the individual can “spend all the power of [their] mind in choosing the paths that
[they] should follow.”10 Solitude is where the individual can fully harness their reason to
investigate what can be certain for them. As such, we can now see how experience and solitude
operate for Descartes, and that there is a necessity for both in the investigative process of certainty.
With this established, we can return to a driving question Descartes has regarding the use of
individual reason: How can everyone be taught to use their reason? To this, Descartes creates his
method.
His method involves four rules.11 The first is “to take nothing as true that is not already
plainly known as such,” and “avoid hasty judgments and prejudices.” What does he mean here? To
“take nothing as true that is not already plainly known as such” tends toward basic rules,
particularly involving mathematics. For example, two plus two equals four is a plain truth. The
avoiding of “hasty judgments and prejudices” is reflective of Descartes’ desire to undo all prior
opinions he held so that he can re-establish what is certain. It also highlights how the process of

René Descartes, Discourse, 6.
René Descartes, Discourse, 6.
11
René Descartes, Discourse, 11.
9

10
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discovering what can be true is in fact a process and investigation; it requires forgetting what one
already knows and beginning anew.
The second rule is to divide all of the difficulties found within a particular claim in order to
be better able to resolve the issues. What is meant by this rule is expressed through an example in
his Meditations.12 He writes about a person having a basket full of apples who is worried that some
of the apples are rotten. In this case, the person needs to empty out all the apples and investigate
each apple to assure it is free of rot before returning it to the basket. This same principle is found
within his second rule - divide up what is uncertain and then investigate each claim until it is found
to be certain. The third rule is to conduct thoughts in an orderly fashion, starting with what is
already known or simplest to know, so that one can “ascend little by little, as by degrees, to the
knowledge of the most composite things.” The fourth and last rule, is to be thorough so that
nothing has been omitted. This requires exploring every path before reaching a conclusion.
When following Descartes’ method, an individual is compelled to use their reason to
establish what is certain. The significance of this method lies not only in its comprehensibility, but
that it reflects the individual’s agency when deciding what is certain. This agency emerges as a
theme in Part One of his Discourse. His declaration of equal ability to reason calls forth any person
to investigate their beliefs and customs. As such, he is teaching a universal method, one that
operates outside the confines of social class, education and wealth. This conceptually provides
limitless power to the individual and how they understand the world around them. The individual
is free to question, explore, and investigate, while needing nothing more than their mind to do so. It

Newman, Lex, "Descartes’ Epistemology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward
Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab: Stanford University, Spring 2019), section 2.2.
12
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is clear that a new wave of agency and critical thought emerges from the beginning of Descartes’
Discourse.
One might now assume that this individual call to be skeptical would immediately translate
into rebellion and revolution, but instead, Descartes suggests the very opposite. In Part Two of his
Discourse, a hesitancy to make change within the political and social sphere appears. Through a
reference to Sparta, he begins to discuss the importance of order and the acceptance of authority:
And, speaking of things human, I believe that if Sparta was at one time very
flourishing, this was not because of the goodness of each one of its laws taken by
itself, seeing that many of them were very strange and even contrary to good
morals, but because, having been devised by a single individual, they all tended
toward the same end.13
The “flourishing” of Sparta is because every individual “tended toward the same end.'' But what
does “flourishing” mean in this context? Based on what is known about Sparta, this is reflective of
the state’s power, specifically its military power and the loyalty of its citizens. He also notes that
many of the laws “were very strange and even contrary to good morals,” but this appears to be of
little relevance to him. What is relevant is that each citizen was obedient and that the city-state was
able to prosper. Furthermore, it is significant to realize that the importance of individual reason
exists within this example too; however, it takes on a different role. The laws “having been devised
by a single individual” create a cohesiveness “toward the same end.'' Politically, only one
individual can act while the rest must follow. As such, the individual must keep their pursuit of
certainty to themselves and obey laws and customs so the state can function.
If the separation between the individual and the collective was not already made clear with
the Sparta example, he then explicitly writes about it in relation to political and social matters:

13

René Descartes, Discourse, 7.
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This is why I could in no way approve of those troublemaking and restless
personalities who, called neither by their birth nor by their fortune to manage public
affairs, are forever coming up with an idea for some new reform in this matter. 14
He affirms the need for authority by claiming that those who are to “manage public affairs” are
strictly people who are born into the position or are brought to that position by fortune. To those
who do not occupy a political position of power but express ideas of reform, he is critical of them
and labels them “troublemaking and restless personalities.” This critique, based off of his Sparta
example, is linked to the continuous production of new ideas of reform which disrupt the social
order because they are not created by the sole person in power. The introduction of new ideas
creates variability within a particular society which would not orient everyone towards the same
ends, and thus, would hinder the state’s ability to prosper. Again, we see the separation Descartes is
establishing between the individual and the collective.
At this point, we might ask: Why is it that once we move into public affairs, the individual’s
agency loses its relevance and significance for Descartes? This question calls us to return to
Descartes’ original focus on the individual establishment of certainty. We already saw that his
method requires doubting until one is absolutely certain, and so, this desire for absolute certainty
appears to also result in a nervousness to disrupt anything outside of the individual’s thoughts
before they are certain. He writes: “These great bodies are too difficult to raise up once they have
been knocked down, or even to hold up once they have been shaken; and their fall can only be
very violent.”15 He is hesitant about disrupting “these great bodies” in any capacity because he
recognizes that once they are knocked down or shaken, they will not be able to be put back up.

14
15

René Descartes, Discourse, 9 .
René Descartes, Discourse, 8 .
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The moment these bodies are disrupted, society would lose the very thing that has grounded them,
hence why he is critical of those who attempt to constantly put forth ideas of reform.
As this passage continues, we see how deeply his nervousness affects even his original
views:
Moreover, as to their imperfections, if they have any (and the mere fact of the
diversity that exists among them suffices to assure one that many do have
imperfections), custom has doubtless greatly mitigated them and even prevented
imperceptibly corrected many of them, against which prudence could not provide
so well. 16
His anxiety regarding the use of individual skepticism against social and political orders leads him
to dismiss the very imperfections which he initially took fault with. He further claims that “custom
has doubtless greatly mitigated” these imperfections and has even corrected many such
imperfections. Was it not this same diversity in custom and these imperfections which lead him to
establish a method in the first place? He continues:
And finally, these imperfections are almost always more tolerable than changing
them would be; similarly, the great roads that wind through mountains little by little
become so smooth and so convenient by dint of being frequently used, that it is
much better to follow them than to try to take a more direct route by climbing over
rocks and descending to the bottom of precipices.17
The fear of not having order due to acting on false certainties forces him to further dismiss these
imperfections all together by claiming that they are “almost always more tolerable than changing
them would be.” He uses the imagery of roads winding through a mountain to reflect the need to
act in a way that maintains the existing order. The “great roads,” meaning the current systems
which rule society, are made “smooth and so convenient by dint of being frequently used, that it is
much better to follow them than to try to take a more direct route.” This call for social obedience

16
17

René Descartes, Discourse, 8 .
René Descartes, Discourse, 8 .
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furthers the gap between the individual’s skepticism and its utility with society. Descartes
concludes the above passage by claiming that if we “try to take a more direct route by climbing
over rocks” we will fall and end up at “the bottom of precipices.” This again reflects his obligation
to certainty, particularly toward political and social change. Reform requires a skepticism that is
precise and results in complete certainty before taking action. Until this certainty is established,
everything else must be maintained because if we “try to take a more direct route,” we risk our
downfall.
Through this analysis of Descartes, we are able to consider the implications of shifting
away from what is considered certain, the connection between certainty and skepticism, and how
the same depositing of certainty affects the individual within different contexts. Descartes
establishes that the only thing he is certain about is an individual’s capacity to reason. Before his
method, certainty was established by what was taught and customary. His method subsequently
removes the ability to blindly accept particular ideas and practices as certain because certainty is
now the result of an individual's pursuit of it through the process of doubt. As such, people must
think critically about themselves and their external world in order to know anything concretely.
This skeptical thought is powerful because it reveals not only what is arbitrary within society, but
also that the individual chooses what paths to take, what to believe, and what to accept.
Descartes’ method wakes one up to their potential, the desire for certainty motivates them,
and skepticism keeps them awake. Conceptualizing certainty and skepticism in this way reveals its
revolutionary implications. There can no longer be a blind obedience and acceptance of laws and
customs. People are now aware and thinking which is dangerous politically and socially because
order and custom now depend on one choosing to maintain it. However, while there is this
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awakening of the individual, we must also recognize that it is followed by an assertion of authority
and order.
Descartes’ prioritization of individual reason forces one to act with whatever the custom or
law is because it creates an environment which is orderly, and thus conducive to the individual's
search for certainty. Returning to his example of Sparta, the rationale as to why it thrived was
because of their maintenance of structure through law. With everyone following the same path
socially and politically, there was cohesion, security, order and the preservation of the state. As
such, the freedoms one sacrifices through obeying custom and law are thought to be mitigated
because in the end, the individual is able to pursue what is certain. Furthermore, because laws are
devised from one person, obedience to these laws orients the collective toward the same end which
results in the further efficiency of the state and avoids disarray. The maintenance of order through
this top down model of governing also allows political certainty to be realized by those in power,
and thus allows for these certainties to be implemented into law. As such, we see that the need for
the individual to obey is not just necessary for the individual's sake, but also for the discovery of
political and social certainty as well.
However, the framing of obedience as a necessary component for the individual and the
political pursuit of certainty disguises the serious implications of this model. By placing emphasis
on the individual's quest for certainty, the ability for the individual to act or voice anything outside
of law or custom becomes problematic. We see that the potential threat for social and political
disunity as a result of individual action forces restrictions on individual freedom. Furthermore, this
framing of obedience to law and custom, paired with the exclusion of individual agency, also
results in the consolidation of political and social agency to those already in a position of authority.
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This conception of the process of certainty acts as a counter to the revolutionary agency established
earlier.
Additionally, while we saw that the adoption of a skeptical attitude results in an awakening
of the individual, politically this skepticism results in disapproval towards immediate change. The
importance of skepticism and certainty are amplified within the political and social sphere because
a mistake in what is certain could risk the very preservation of the state. Therefore, one needs to be
absolutely certain before acting and by virtue of this need for absolutism, change must be a slow
and sure process. Furthermore, with the omittance of the individual’s voice within the political
sphere, this assumes doubt over who is able to reason. This hierarchical approach regarding whose
certainty matters not only emerges as a result of Descartes’ political skepticism, but also serves to
challenge his original claim of an equal capacity to reason.
Through tracking the role of certainty and skepticism in Descartes’ Discourse on Method,
we see two inclinations appear: one toward revolution and one toward conservatism. While his
method propels an individual to discover what can be certain for them, the expression of their
findings is limited. The moment we enter into society, we are expected to obey laws, custom, and
authority because the risk of dismantling the social order from the assertion of false certainty
overrides the value of voicing any new, and perhaps uncertain, ideas at all. Certainty, which is the
establishment of something beyond doubt, creating these polar opposite movements is striking.
This vast difference forces us to reconsider how certainty and skepticism operate, what they reveal,
and under what conditions they can be useful.
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2
Rousseau's Certainty: Equality in Theory and Practice
If Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s involvement in politics is unquestioned, his reception and
influence is as mixed as it is extensive; he has indeed been constructed as both an enemy and
protector of liberty. Figures such as Jacques Pierre Brissot, who led the Girondins during the
French Revolution, disliked Rousseau and his relatively anti-universalist principles. Likewise,
Baron d’Holbach, another philosopher who took his influence from Denis Diderot, especially took
notice of Rousseau's indoctrination of the “Spartan martial spirit” and the “narrow chauvinism
[Rousseau’s] thought appeared to encourage.” However, after the fall of Bastille in July of 1789,
Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, comte de Mirabeau, who was a leader in the beginning of the French
Revolution, praised Rousseau “for his central role in preparing the Revolution,” writing that “never
should one speak of liberty and the Revolution without paying homage to this immortal ‘vengeur
de la nature humaine’.”18 Unsurprisingly, while Rousseau’s position within academic circles was
ambiguous, he otherwise was “the unrivaled chief teacher and prophet venerated by revolutionary
popular culture.” During the one year anniversary of Bastille's fall, a parade commenced and the
Place de la Bastille was decorated with garlands and revolutionary symbols. A large bust of
Rousseau, with a civic crown on its head, was “carried in triumph around the ruins” while the
crowd sung “a specially composed hymn summoning all to invoke the ‘holy name of Rousseau,
this sublime name’.”19

Jonathan Israel, Revolutionary Ideas: An Intellectual History of the French Revolution from The
Rights of Man to Robespierre (United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 2014), 21.
19
Jonathan Israel, Revolutionary Ideas, 130-131.
18
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While it was the range of Rousseau’s reception which initially provoked my interest, I
became increasingly curious to explore how his work could give rise to such a spectrum of political
positions. Through a close reading of The Social Contract, I will suggest that this reception is a
result of a tension between the content of Rousseau’s ideas, which seem to be revolutionary
through and through, and their implementation, which speaks to more conservative trends.
Ultimately in this chapter, I aim to highlight that the tension between potentiality and actuality is
driven by two different motivations - the first, to establish equality and the second, the productive
necessity of inequality. Alongside these motivations, I will point to the idea of transparency, being
that it is central for Rousseau in his understanding of the transition from the state of nature to that of
society.
In The First Discourse: Discourse on the Sciences and Arts Rousseau writes:
In truth, human nature was no better than now, but people found security in the ease
with which they could see through one another, and this advantage, of which we no
longer appreciate the value, saved them from many vices.20
We see that a sense of certainty develops from the ease of being able to see through one another,
and it is precisely this loss of certainty from transparency that has catastrophic effects:
What a parade of ills accompany this uncertainty! No more sincere friendships, no
more real regard for another, no more deep trust. Suspicions, resentments, fears,
coldness, reserve, hatred, and betrayal habitually hide under that uniform and
perfidious veil of politeness, under that lauded sophistication which we owe to the
enlightenment of our century.21
Without the certainty of transparency, we find ourselves in an abysmal state-no way to know
ourselves, no way to know others and no trust or unity. We instead are now suspicious, resentful,

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and The First and Second Discourses, ed. Susan
Dunn et al (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2002), 49.
21
Rousseau, Social Contract, ed. Dunn, 50.
20
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reserved but “habitually hide under that uniform and perfidious veil of politeness.” Uncertainty
breeds not only uniformity because people are afraid to be themselves, but it also breeds a fear of
others. We have no ability to form sincere connections with people and operate only within the
superficial “veil of politeness.” Thus, we are all chained and perpetuate the same system that is
ruining humankind. As we can see, certainty as established through transparency is paramount in
understanding not only what is lost in society but also in understanding Rousseau’s politics in The
Social Contract.
If we begin by looking at the opening lines of The Social Contract, we are able to get an
idea of what Rousseau aims to do politically:
My purpose is to consider if, in political society, there can be any legitimate and
sure principle of government, taking men as they are and laws as they might be.22
These lines highlight exactly what Rousseau strikes to be certain about, namely if there can be “any
legitimate and sure principle of government.” However, what is notable about this opening is that
this investigation is anchored by his underlying certainty of what men are. For my purposes in
grappling with Rousseau’s political ideas, it is necessary for us to discover what, for him,
constitutes the nature of man. This explanation lies partially in his understanding of the state of
nature to civil society, a progression where transparency, equality and inequality come together.
Rousseau’s vision of the state of nature is in many ways a response to Hobbes; the latter
wrote that it is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”23 Rousseau, in his essay Discourse on the
Origin and the Foundations of Inequality Among Mankind, argues that the state of nature is where
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humans thrive and are complete. It is there that individuals, driven by passion rather than the
constraints of learned culture,-are most like themselves-simple and complete. Rousseau writes:
I see him satisfying his hunger under an oak, and his thirst at the first brook; I see
him laying himself down to sleep at the foot of the same tree that afforded him his
meal; and there are all his wants completely supplied.24
Within this primitive picture, the individual is self-sufficient and able to be so because the passions
remain centered around basic survival. For Rousseau, these notions of basic survival do not always
equate to a life of solitude because the passions occasionally drive the individual to interact with
another of their species:
Hunger and other appetites made him at different times experience different modes
of existence; one of these excited him to perpetuate his species; and this blind
propensity, quite void of anything like pure love or affection, produced nothing but
an act that was merely animal. Their need once gratified, the sexes took no further
notice of each other, and even the child was nothing to his mother, the moment he
could do without her.25
While there are these interactions, what remains interesting is that the individual does not notice
another until one feels the appetite to continue the species and even with this recognition, it is done
with “blind propensity.” The very moment the appetite is satisfied,“the sexes [take] no further
notice of one another” and continue as if the interaction never happened. Likewise, as soon as the
child is able to sustain itself, it means “nothing to [it’s] mother.” While there are these interactions,
there appears to be a gap between recognizing another human in terms of understanding them as a
being and seeing them as merely a tool for self-survival, just how the man saw the oak tree.
While humans remained dominated by their passions, reproduction forces humans to adapt
and invent in order to survive because resources which were at first easy to find eventually became
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scarce. This ability to invent is what Rousseau calls perfectibilité, which is the capacity to progress
and serves as human's simultaneous source of enlightenment and vice:
There was a necessity for becoming active, swiftfooted, and sturdy in battle. The
natural arms, which are stones and the branches of trees, soon offered themselves to
his reach. He learned to surmount the obstacles of nature, to fight when necessary
with other animals, to fight for his subsistence even with other men, or indemnify
himself for the loss of whatever he found himself obliged to yield to a stronger.26
While it becomes necessary for humans to evolve physically in order to survive, their perception of
the world around them also evolves. “Natural arms” or axes “soon offered themselves to [their]
reach.” Even though branches and stones existed prior, the point is that they were not seen as
useful until survival depended on their combination. Likewise, an individual now needs to be
prepared to fight in order to survive, and thus needs to be aware of their surroundings in ways they
had not before. Self-preservation now requires one to learn how to make relational judgments
about who is stronger, but in order for this judgment to be made, one needs to learn about their
own capabilities. Through the inevitable experience of battle and competition, the individual is
tested and learns about themself through the recognized differences in strength or strategy they
have with others.
As nature continues to change, and competition continues to increase, perception and
recognition continue to evolve. However, what is interesting is that instead of perceiving difference
in times of threat, humans begin to perceive the quality of likeness:
[…]and seeing that they all behaved as he himself would have done in similar
circumstances, he concluded that their manner of thinking and feeling was quite
conformable to his own; and this important truth, when once engraved deeply on
his mind, made him follow, by an intuition as sure and swift as any reasoning, the
best rules of conduct, which for the sake of his own safety and advantage it was
proper he should observe toward them.27
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Through seeing another behave in the same manner they would have, one is made to follow “by an
intuition as sure and swift as any reasoning” the “best rules of conduct.” This recognition of
another as someone like them provides the individual with an intuitive understanding of the person,
regardless of experience. This is a significant moment within Rousseau's narrative as it pertains to
transparency because one can intrinsically know what to do based on their ability to recognize
another as thinking and feeling in a similar manner as they would. It is this repeated recognition of
likeness which allows one to realize that their “common interest might authorize him to count on
the assistance of his fellows” which Rousseau labels “free associations.”28 These “free
associations” obligated no one and lasted only as long as the “transitory necessity that had given
birth to it.”29 This recognition of likeness not only provides for a priori understanding of the other,
but also opens up the possibility for an unprecedented conscious joining of forces. These “free
associations” were achievable because humans felt they “[understood] each other perfectly.”30 It
was only through seeing another behave as they would have, and thus having the motivations of
each other clear in mind, which allowed individuals for the first time to think plurally in terms of
survival, and thus join together for a common goal which otherwise might not have been
achievable.
As Rousseau’s progression through the state of nature continues, humans proceeded to
become “more industrious in proportion as [their] mind[s] became more enlightened” meaning
instead of sleeping under the oak tree, one now finds shelter in cabins. This transformation, which
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Rousseau deems the “epoch of the first revolution,” paired with the learned success of “free
associations,” is what led to the family unit and an “introduction of a species of property.”31
Humans learned that there is a benefit in numbers, particularly because it affords an increase in
ability to defend and protect property:
[...]no one could have any great temptation to seize upon that of his neighbor, not so
much because it did not belong to him, as because he did not need it; and as he
could not make himself master of it without exposing himself to a very sharp fight
with the family that was occupying it.32
With the establishment of a familial unit, “no one could not have any great temptation to seize upon
that of his neighbor” because of the realization that one would be outnumbered, and thus be at a
disadvantage. Rousseau concludes that these individuals found it “shorter and safer to imitate, than
to attempt to dislodge” and so we find the creation of small societies through this new sedentary
life.
In this new social state, “everyone began to notice the rest, and wished to be noticed
himself; and public esteem acquired a value.” Some traits became more respected than others such
as who was “the handsomest, the strongest, the most dexterous, or the more eloquent.”33 For
Rousseau, these preferences become the first step toward inequality and vice.34 While one felt a
sense of vanity and contempt for possessing the preferred traits, another felt envy and shame for
not. Over time, it became the individuals’ prerogative “to appear what they really were not” so that
they could gain an advantage in society, and on an even more basic level, simply fit in with
custom.35 Through this process, individuals become chained to culture, and thus lose the ability to
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freely be themselves because their value became set off of how well they could fit a mold. As
society grew more enlightened, the weight of these chains grew heavier, and eventually we arrive
at the society Rousseau wrote of in The First Discourse - a society plagued by uncertainty due to
the loss of transparency. With this understanding, we will see how Rousseau’s “general will”
attempts to re-establish transparency and also equality through the idea of a shared common will.
In The Social Contract, Rousseau makes clear two different wills: the “will of all” and the
“general will.” The will of all is concerned with private interest, while the general will is concerned
with the common interest. We arrive at the general will by taking away “the pluses and minuses
[from the will of all] which cancel each other out” leaving whatever “remains [as] the general
will.”36 Right away, the general will is attempting to resurrect transparency while simultaneously
combating inequality because “if the general will is to be clearly expressed, it is imperative that
there should be no sectional associations in the state, and that every citizen should make up his
own mind for himself.”37 The expression of “every citizen” is of the utmost importance, because
without it, the general will can not be determined. Furthermore, the general will overrides the value
in “appear[ing] what they really [are] not” and instead calls for humans to be exactly who they are,
so that ultimately, they can be united by a common will. Rousseau is calling for transparency and
equality as the means of uniting people in a world where it has become disadvantageous for the
individual to be transparent because that could mean risking the very social status which
determines their own value. However, this deep change in the fundamentals of man begs the
question of how the general will could be implemented, particularly when some individuals profit
off of the perpetuation of inequality. It is here that we are introduced to the sovereign.
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One might think that the role of a sovereign fundamentally undermines the premise of
equality; however, Rousseau makes clear that equality is not lost:
It is not a covenant between a superior and an inferior, but a covenant of the body
with each of its members. It is a legitimate covenant, because its basis is the social
contract; an equitable one, because it is common to all; a useful one, because it can
have no end but the common good; and it is a durable covenant because it is
guaranteed by the armed forces and the supreme power. So long as the subjects
submit to such covenants alone, they obey nobody but their own will; and to ask
how far the respective rights of the sovereign and the citizen extend is to ask how
far these two can pledge themselves together, each to all and all to each.38
The relationship between citizen and sovereign is not one of inferior and superior, but is an
agreement to “the body with each of its members” only. This agreement is “legitimate” because its
basis is found within the people. It is fair because it is the same for everyone, including the
sovereign, and it is useful because it can have “no end but the common good.” The sovereign and
the citizen must “pledge themselves together, each to all and all to each” which again reflects a
sense of equality and unity, even when there is an active authority figure concretely enforcing the
rights of the citizen. As much as the sovereign is enforcing such rights, the sovereign’s rights are
likewise contingent on the citizen’s willingness to obey. Although it might not be entirely obvious,
transparency is relevant within this dynamic as well. The relationship can fundamentally only exist
as long as the citizen and the sovereign are transparent with one another, hence the need to pledge
“each to all and all to each.” Both of their positionalities are dependent on one another being
transparent in terms of intention and action, which means operating under the terms that make the
covenant equitable and legitimate. We can again see this need for transparency and furthermore
how it becomes necessary for establishing and maintaining equality, particularly in an objectively
hierarchical relationship.
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However, Rousseau in the above passage also writes that the covenant is durable because it
is “guaranteed by the armed forces and the supreme being.” Both the idea of an armed force and a
supreme being stuck out to me as running counter to the overwhelming sense of equality and need
for transparency otherwise found within the passage. The need to have someone physically enforce
the general will raises questions of if the citizens are viewing the will as their own. If they were,
why would there need to be armed forces to ensure its durability in the first place? Likewise, the
“supreme being” within this context refers to God, but claiming that the covenant is durable
because of God forces us to consider how this could be. Particularly when Rousseau claims “all
justice comes from God, who alone is its source” and that “if only we knew how to receive
[justice] from that exalted fountain, we should need neither governments nor laws.”39 Laws remain
to be the “conditions on which civil society exists” and we are unable to receive knowledge from
God, but yet the covenant is also made durable because of God.40 If we need laws and can not
receive laws from God, we are left to consider where just laws can come from:
To discover the rules of society that are best suited to nations, there would need to
exist a superior intelligence, who could understand the passions of men without
feeling any of them, who had no affinity with our nature but knew it to the full,
whose happiness was independent of ours, but who would nevertheless make out
happiness his concern, who would be content to wait in the fullness of time for a
distant glory, and to labour in one age to enjoy the fruits of another. Gods would be
needed to give men laws.41
The fact that “Gods would be needed to give men laws” suggests the impossibility of the task of
discovering what laws are “best suited to nations.” However, even if the task is impossible or
requires a God, we still are introduced to the lawgiver. The lawgiver “is the engineer who invents
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the machine; the prince is merely the mechanic who sets it up and operates it.”42 What does he
mean when he uses the word “machine” and that it is something to be “set up and operated?”
Knowing what we do about the relationship of the sovereign and the citizen, presumably this is a
reference to laws, which if we recall, were supposed to come from the general will. If the lawgiver
is establishing laws, and Gods would be needed to give men laws, it is reasonable to conclude that
the lawgiver is a God-like figure. I argue the presence of the lawgiver complicates what otherwise
is a clear call for transparency and equality in civil society.
The relationship between the lawgiver and the sovereign and citizens is fundamentally
different from that of the citizens and that of the sovereign and citizen. The lawgiver is the
“engineer who invents the machine” while the sovereign is “merely the mechanic who sets it up
and operates it.” The word choice of “inventor” juxtaposed with “merely the mechanic” provides
an undeniable sense of superiority in favor of the lawgiver, which outwardly appears to run counter
to the attempts of establishing equality. Likewise, the general will, which was supposed to be
established by the people and served to unite them because it was their own laws and thus an
extension of them, is actually created by the lawgiver who discovers the laws to which society
operates. Here we see notions of equality come into tension with the necessity of inequality. The
citizens are uniting to establish their general will but the lawgiver, because of their superior
qualities, can override the citizens. This leads us to question what exactly the general will is:
[…]the general will is always rightful and always tends to the public good; but it
does not follow that the deliberations of the people are always equally right. We
always want what is advantageous to us but we do not always discern it. The
people is never corrupted, but it is often misled; and only then does it seem to will
what is bad. 43
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The general will is still geared toward the public good, however the people are “often misled” and
thus will what is “bad” because they are “not always able to discern'' what is advantageous to
them. This inability for people to know what is good for them, paired with their frequent ability to
be deceived, is why there is a need for the lawgiver. Through this claim, the necessity of inequality
becomes apparent because without the lawgiver, the people could never know what the “common
good” is. However, if the people discovered that their efforts and involvement in establishing the
general will were useless, it is not hard to imagine how this would easily destroy the uniting and
equalizing effects transparency established through the general will for the citizens. It is the
recognition of this potential reversal, which helps to explain why the lawgiver's position, in terms
of office and power, is deliberately made obscure.
The lawgiver is “extraordinary not only because of his genius, but equally because of his
office, which is neither that of the government nor that of the sovereign.” The lawgiver also has
seemingly unchecked, undetectable power. The lawgiver “must have recourse to an authority of
another order, one which can compel without violence and persuade without convincing.”44 What
is this “authority of another order?” It is divine intervention:
It is this which has obliged the founders of nations throughout history to appeal to
divine intervention and to attribute their own wisdom to the Gods; for then the
people, feeling subject to the laws of the state as they are to those of nature, and
detecting the same hand in the creation of both man and the nation, obey freely and
bear with docility the yoke of public welfare.45
If we return to Rousseau’s description of the “supreme being” as making the covenant durable, this
ability for one person to claim divine intervention proves to be extremely significant. Essentially,
this trick forces (for without this trick, one otherwise might not obey) the citizen to “obey freely
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and bear with docility the yoke of public welfare.” While most would consider this to be a lie,
Rousseau astonishingly calls it “sublime reasoning,” but it nonetheless serves to condition man
toward what the lawgiver perceives to be the common good:
This sublime reasoning, which soars above the heads of the common people, is
used by the lawgiver when he puts his own decisions into the mouth of the
immortals, thus compelling by divine authority persons who cannot be moved by
human prudence.46
If the people cannot recognize through their own reason that the lawgiver (to their knowledge, the
sovereign) is correct, they will be compelled “by divine authority” to follow what the lawgiver
prescribes. The lawgiver can lie without being discovered, so much so, it “soars above the heads of
the common people.” He is both everywhere and nowhere; he exists outside of the government,
sovereign and has absolute power, all the while remaining undetected by the people.
As it was shown to us before through Rousseau’s account of man, inequality precludes
transparency. This still is true, however, something is different in the case of the lawgiver because
Rousseau endorses their superiority and praises their obscurity from the citizens. The loss of
transparency on behalf of the lawgiver to the citizen is built into his politics, and subsequently is
not treated as a loss but rather a necessary movement. Inequality is deemed productive and
necessary because without it, the general will could never remain geared toward the common
good. The citizens remain oblivious to the fact that they have no say in their laws, and that they are
actually being conditioned to obey the “yoke of public welfare.” The role of the lawgiver shows
that inequality is necessary and politically productive because of the transformative effects it can
have on man; however, man must remain unaware of this process. In this way, we conclude from
Rousseau that the perception of transparency in politics is, in many ways, necessary, but actual
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transparency is not; in fact, actual transparency would undermine the work being done to condition
man toward public welfare. Likewise, political inequality is necessary but must remain hidden
because if realized, it would reveal that the general will does not actually come from the citizens
directly, but that it is imposed on them.
If we now return back to the opening line of The Social Contract, this understanding
allows us to engage the potential of the aforementioned “if” more directly:
My purpose is to consider if, in political society, there can be any legitimate and
sure principle of government, taking men as they are and laws as they might be.
It appears to me that we could go one of two ways - the first being that we take the illusion of
transparency and inequality as necessary in order to establish equality, and the second being the
fictional capacity of the lawgiver, and thus the impossibility of equality. Beginning with the former,
if we have a society that profits off of inequality and has no way to unite together because of the
mistrust and deception which has become customary, it is arguable that society would need to be
conditioned toward equality. However, this conditioning would need to be conducted by someone
who knows how to obtain equality within society, while also establishing equality in secret for the
people would likely not endorse such a transformation. So, we find the illusion of transparency
amongst the people in that they are uniting under the idea of the general will, which they have no
control over, and we find inequality in the relationship between the lawgiver and the citizen. Both
of which remain necessary in the establishment of equality. However, to frame the possibility of
establishing equality as conditional on having a lawgiver who is to be a God in human form,
strikes to be mere fiction. As such, if the lawgiver itself is impossible, it follows that equality is also
unobtainable - and so we reach the latter of the possible directions.
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Returning back to the former, the only reason the manipulation of the people is acceptable
is because it serves the purpose of the common good. However, this assumes that the lawgiver is
able to know (with absolute certainty) truths that the people are incapable of knowing, such as
what the common good is. Due to this, the lawgiver is afforded the freedom to condition the people
with absolute power. This linkage between certainty and power makes sense; however, one must
push back and ask how this certainty can be tested, or if it even can be tested. When we consider
the claim “worthless tricks may set up transitory bonds, but only wisdom makes lasting ones” it
appears time can be the only judge of the lawgiver's supposed certainty.47 What does this mean for
the citizens living under the hidden direction of the lawgiver? Blind obedience and thus, no agency
due to the illusion of transparency of the general will from the lawgiver - imagine all that could be
lost if the lawgiver is wrong but likewise, all that could be gained if the lawgiver is correct. Is it the
granting of absolute power worth the risk?
We might also ask to what end? Both in terms of the individual and societal longevity.
Although equality might be obtainable, it appears that the individual through this conditioning
jeopardizes their very personhood. Likewise, the very restructuring of society could result in the
complete collapse of it. Rousseau notes that “a people does not become famous until its
constitution begins to decline. We do not know for how many centuries the constitution of
Lycurgus gave happiness to the Spartans before there was talk about them in the rest of Greece.”48
If a constitution fails, does this not mean those who wrote it were wrong? Rousseau glorifies
Sparta, but Sparta no longer exists. Thus, time will tell that Lycurgus was objectively wrong by
Rousseau's standard because he did not establish a lasting bond. Furthermore, it seems that the
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collapse of Sparta is not even a problem for Rousseau considering he instead emphasizes how we
could not possibly know for how many centuries “Lycurgus gave happiness to the Spartans,”
while assuming the effects of the constitution were that of happiness to begin with. Sparta was a
warrior society, had many slaves, and was centered around ideas of duty and obedience toward the
state - interesting qualities Rousseau equates with “happiness.”
With Sparta serving as the example for Rousseau, paired with what he presents in The
Social Contract, it seems to me that the reconditioning of man under particular terms may render an
equal man and a place where transparency can once again be realized, but it is only made possible
through the secret stripping down of man and the manipulation of what remains. Can this
transparency even be called transparency if it is realized through imposition? Can equality be
established within a framework where it is not realized and enforced by the power of an
institution? Regardless, the basic notion that this political certainty has existed before through
Sparta and could exist again, is dangerous, particularly when the ability to determine if it is faulty is
dependent on time. Which, as we consider Maximilien Robespierre, it will show just how
dangerous the notion of political certainty can be.
Robespierre campaigned on a vision of democracy from The Social Contract arguing that
the rule of the people was to “ensure the triumph of the good, pure, general will of the people what the people would want in ideal circumstances - and this needed to be intuited on their behalf
until they had received sufficient education to understand their own good.”49 He issued a journal
which served as a platform for him to express “both his theoretical and his practical political
concerns.” He pushed to be a representative of the Third Estate, which he was elected to in 1789
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and before he left to go to Versailles, he published a pamphlet entitled ‘The Enemies of the
Fatherland Unmasked,’ which is reflective of his political paranoia and the need to establish
transparency.50
In August of 1792, he was elected to the municipal Commune governing Paris just two
days after the fall of the monarchy. His speeches during this time “had a peculiar combination of
acute political suspicion and personal animosity towards anyone who disagreed with him.”51 He
was often quoting some version of Rousseau, and quoted directly the phrase: le peuple veut le bien,
mais il ne le voit pas toujours meaning the people want what is good, but they do not always see it.
52

On November 5th of 1792, Robespierre was elected to the new National Convention, which

held significant power being that it’s members were elected to provide the new constitution of
France. Later that month, the Convention decided on making France a republic to which
Robespierre was determined to separate the members of the Convention who wanted the republic
for selfish reasons and those, like Robespierre, who wanted to found the republic on the principle
of equality and the general interest.53 Prior to this decision, Robespierre had been “too busy” to
publish his journal, but after the republic was decided on, he saw it as an opportunity to revisit his
long standing fear of executive power.
In one article, Robespierre quotes a passage from Rousseau where he is describing the
qualities of the lawgiver:
To discover the rules of society that are best suited to nations, there would need to
exist a superior intelligence, who could understand the passions of men without
feeling any of them who had no affinity with our nature but knew it to the full,
whose happiness was independent of ours, but who would nevertheless make out
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happiness his concern, who would be content to wait in the fullness of time for a
distant glory, and to labour in one age to enjoy the fruits of another. Gods would be
needed to give men laws.
However, instead of leaving the passage as is, Robespierre adjusts it and formulates his own
version to be published as well:
You will need philosophers as enlightened as they were intrepid: who experienced
the passions of man, but whose first passions would be the horror of tyranny and
the love of humanity; treading underfoot vanity, envy, ambition and all the
weaknesses of petty souls, inexorable toward crime armed with power, indulgent
toward error, sympathetic toward misery and tender and respectful toward the
people.54
This new version not only eliminated the association of the lawgiver as God and framed it so “an
unusually admirable human being-Robespierre himself, for example” could act as the lawgiver, but
it also took the idea of the lawgiver as an impossibility and shifted it to the realm of possibility.55
Less than a year later on July 27, 1793, Robespierre was voted onto the Committee of Public
Safety where under his leadership, the committee came to exercise dictatorial control over the
French government, all the while claiming the Russeauistic ideals of “a prim society of patriotic,
uncorrupted, serious equals.”56 And so we find that the lawgiver, with all of its absolute power,
becomes a reality.
Less than two months later, The Reign of Terror begins led by none other than
Robespierre. During this time, Robespierre jailed and killed anyone who was perceived to be
against his Revolution. This paranoia, while in many ways reflects the original need for
transparency, it also, to some extent, reflects its practical impossibility - one can never really know
the motivations of another because we are humans, not Gods. Nonetheless, Robespierre’s reality
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became the only reality that mattered. He operated with absolute certainty as the lawgiver,
believing that he was revolutionizing France, but as time has shown us, he was not only wrong,
but ruined any progress the Revolution had made toward equality. As such, we are left again to
consider if the risk of having a lawgiver is worthwhile and by doing so, question the possibility
and/or limitations of political certainty. This questioning of political certainty brings us to the
second potential of the “if,” that being the fictional capacity of the lawgiver.
“Gods would be needed to give men laws” but yet, Rousseau introduces the lawgiver not
as a God, but as a man. The lawgiver is someone who has incredible genius, and thus an ability to
know what the common good is and therefore serves to correct the general will when the people
are misled. The lawgiver, as argued earlier, has absolute authority. He is the “engineer” of the
political system, while his office remains outside of the government and sovereign. He is the man
behind the curtain, an omnipotent being. In every respect, the lawgiver parallels that of a God, but
Rousseau still distinguishes them as human. An example of this is when Rousseau writes of divine
intervention being “used by the lawgiver when he puts his own decisions into the mouth of the
immortals.” Differentiation is done to separate the lawgiver from that of the immortals; however,
the lawgiver has the power to “put his own decisions into the mouth of the immortals” and
effectively convince the citizens to follow his decisions. In this way, we can see how Rousseau
writes that the lawgiver is not a God, but when it comes to his power, is very much a God. While
Rousseau continues to claim the lawgiver is a man, within the particular system as presented in The
Social Contract, the line between God and man is blurred. It is this blurring and confusion that
surrounds the lawgiver which makes it apparent that an entity sporting the qualities of a lawgiver
would not only be rare, but altogether unthinkable. As such, this impossibility forces us to consider
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if Rousseau was aware of the impossibility of the lawgiver, and if not, why? And if so, what is the
purpose of the lawgiver?
Jean Starobinski, who has written and analyzed Rousseau extensively as a literary critic,
approaches Rousseau and the entirety of his work from a psychoanalytic lens. Starobinski argues
that Rousseau’s need for transparency began within himself and thus expanded outward rendering
Rousseau paranoid about “an overbearing world of infinite obstacles.” Starobinski argues further
that Rousseau's politics are a commitment to liberate man from the “ornamentation and masking
that defined aristocratic society.”57 Although this is a simplified account of Starobinski’s argument,
it does reflect why Rousseau clung to transparency and a desire to return to his state of nature. In
this way, we could conceive of the argument that it did not matter if the lawgiver was largely
fictional in practice, but that for Rousseau himself, it was important he was able to establish the
possibility, no matter how slight, of a return to the state of nature and the resurrection of
transparency. While this shift of focus to Rousseau’s “neurosis” allows us to make sense of his
work (especially the inconsistencies), there is still much to be gained if we pay attention to the text
itself, particularly through the struggle he displays in distinguishing the lawgiver from God.
As we analyze this struggle, what remains most striking is Rousseau's determination to
maintain that the lawgiver is a man, not a God. Even when Rousseau writes that laws would need
to come from Gods, he still declares that the lawgiver is human. No matter how much the lawgiver
operates as a God, Rousseau continues to deem them as a man. This suggests that Rousseau is
grappling with a particular tension - the potential for equality and the actuality of equality. The
continued delineation of the two (man and God) reflects his yearning for the possibility of equality
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in society while the substantive role of the lawgiver reflects the opposite. The actuality of such a
lawgiver in itself is impossible, and it is through this impossibility, which suggests that equality
within society is unrealizable. In this way, Rousseau's project becomes far more dynamic. It was
already shown that there is a tension between the desire for equality and the simultaneous need to
have a lawgiver with absolute power and who is deceitful toward the citizens in order to establish
equality. While the struggle Rousseau displays reflects the same problem of potentiality and
actuality, instead of it being intentional, it feels rather unintentional. This speaks not only to the
weight of the tension, but also to the fact that the question of the potential of equality within society
remains a question, even if he seems to have an answer.
Rousseau’s political conclusions are confusing, contradictory and counterintuitive for a
number of reasons. However, his continued engagement with the tension between the potential and
the actual should not be overlooked. If we pay attention to the inconsistencies which emerge from
his attempt to reconcile equality with society, we are left to question the risk and benefit of political
certainty, the ability or inability for the individual to transform to the collective, and ultimately and
most profoundly, what can connect us together as humans, particularly in civil society. While
Rousseau’s conclusions lend themselves to both poles of the political spectrum, so do the questions
which emerge from his work. As such, we once again find ourselves left uncertain on how these
tensions can be resolved, if at all.
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3
Burke’s Skepticism: Revolution vs. Reform
Before I delve into the specifics of the chapter, I would be remiss to not point out the
significance it has for me. I began this project curious about the role of skepticism, particularly the
ways in which it grants the freedom to question what we hold to be true and thus gives each
individual the ability to determine what is certain, as we saw so powerfully with Descartes. But, as
this is true, I was also curious to see how skepticism might work in the opposite way. As much as
skepticism can provide freedom and agency, skepticism is always a narrative in progress and one
that can be retold. Skepticism can also generate an avoidant turning back and over-reliance on
what is immediate. This second movement of skepticism will be my focus.
In this chapter, I will turn to Edmund Burke, who is considered to be the founder of
modern conservatism, despite the fact that in the 19th century, he had a split political reception just
like Jean-Jacques Rousseau did. Burke was deemed “the greatest Englishman since Milton” by
Thomas Macaulay, and this same verdict was later endorsed by John Morley.58 Alternatively,
Burke was practically pilloried by Karl Marx in Das Kapital where Marx wrote:
The sycophant-who in the pay of the English oligarchy played the romantic
laudator temporis acti against the French Revolution just as, in the pay of the North
American colonies at the beginning of the American troubles, he had played the
liberal against the English oligarchy- was an out-and-out vulgar bourgeois.59
Marx refers to Burke as the sycophant, and as such, minimizes Burke’s political ideas as being
nothing more than a servile obedience to the English oligarchy. He accuses Burke of superficially

Dennis O’Keeffe, Edmund Burke: Major Conservative and Libertarian Thinkers, (New York:
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013) 90.
59
Karl Marx et al., Capital: A Critique of Political Economy , (United States: Modern Library, 1906),
832.
58

Rosenthal 37
playing the “romantic laudator temporis acti” against the French Revolution, precisely because the
French Revolution was attempting to destroy the same unequal systems which the English
oligarchy profited from. All in all, Marx views Burke as nothing more than a puppet for the
English oligarchy and the continuation of its principles against any equalizing efforts made on
behalf of the proletariat.
Mary Wollstonecraft also has an equally important critique of Burke. In response to Burke's
Reflections on the Revolution in France, she writes in her Vindication of the Rights of Men:
Misery to reach your heart I perceive, must have its caps and bells; your tears are
reserved, very naturally considering your character, for the declamation of the
theater, or for the downfall of queens, whose rank throws a graceful veil over vices
that degrade humanity; but the distress of many industrious mothers whose
helpmates have been torn from them, and the hungry cry of the helpless babes,
were vulgar sorrows that could not move your commiseration, though they might
extort an alms.60
Due to Burke’s elitism, Wollstonecraft accuses him of not only caring for just the aristocrats, but of
being incapable of feeling any emotion toward the rest of society. She notes that even the cry of
hunger from helpless babes still could not provoke his compassion and pity but yet, he is very
readily able to cry at “the downfall of the queen” whose very existence serves to place a “graceful
veil” over the unequal and oppressive systems which govern the people.
While both Marx and Wollstonecraft offer quite damning criticism of Burke, I do however
wish to consider the purpose of Burke’s position, particularly because “no other philosophical
writing on politics succeeded in predicting so accurately and with such relevant specificity the
course of subsequent events.”61 Burke began writing Reflections on the Revolution in France in
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January or February of 1790, while the book itself was published in November of that same year.
This is to say that Burke was writing during the “peaceful year of the Revolution” and still warned
with remarkable accuracy of what would follow in France.62 As such, Burke deserves to be
explored beyond the simplifications which Marx and Wollstonecraft make of his political ideology.
I will therefore attempt to bring forth some of Burke’s complexities.
While we saw in “Rousseau's Certainty: Equality in Theory and Practice” that Rousseau
began from the premise that equality is necessary and good in principle but then came to the
conclusion that equality might not be politically feasible in actuality, I will argue that Burke’s
skepticism leads him to begin his thinking with the acceptance of inequality as a present and
necessary reality. I will claim that because of this acceptance of inequality, Burke is able to engage
with the tension between the potentiality and actuality of equality directly, which results in a
political ideology that opposes revolution, but yet prioritizes reform.
Burke undoubtedly relies on the idea of inheritance, but while he has been criticized for
placing a superficial value on tradition, we are able to see why it is of genuine importance to him:
You will observe that from Magna Charta to the Declaration of Right it has been the
uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert our liberties as an entailed
inheritance derived to us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our
posterity—as an estate specially belonging to the people of this kingdom, without
any reference whatever to any other more general or prior right. By this means our
constitution preserves a unity in so great a diversity of its parts. We have an
inheritable crown, an inheritable peerage, and a House of Commons and a people
inheriting privileges, franchises, and liberties from a long line of ancestors. This
policy appears to me to be the result of profound reflection, or rather the happy
effect of following nature, which is wisdom without reflection, and above it.63
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Burke views inheritance similarly to how we view culture: it is cultivated over time, it has with it
the capacity to unite, it carries with it a sense of respect as well as a desire to reflect on how it came
to be, and establishes a deep valuement of what it represents. As such, Burke brings attention to the
fact that across England's constitutional history, their “uniform policy” has been the claiming and
asserting of liberties as a result of “inheritance derived to [them] from [their] forefathers, and to be
transmitted to [their] posterity.” While the idea of inheritance does contain the passing of material
assets, it is not limited to this. As a society, we inherit laws and systems of governance, which for
Burke, represent wisdom that is cultivated and reflected upon from every generation which came
before. This generational connection is an intimate one for Burke in that he suggests a parallel
between ancestral inheritance and national inheritance. The laws and systems come to exist from a
shared lineage of forefathers, which in turn creates a familial connection from every citizen to
England, so much so that Burke notes England to be an “estate specially belonging to the people of
this kingdom.”
While Burke identifies this claiming of estate as a birthright, we must also point out the
resonance this has to both Marx and Wollstonecraft. It is almost as if Burke does not consider the
total implications of what he is arguing. By specifically stating that the laws of England were
specially drafted by England’s forefathers, and thus establishes a magical and respectable bond
from the citizens to their country, it appears rather cosmetic. When considering someone who
descends from an ancestry of peasants and has very little, it is superficial to ignore this aspect and
instead glorify the fact that they are still an Englishman or Englishwoman. It is also rather cruel to
then pretend that they have equal inheritance to the estate of England. While this is a problematic
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consequence of Burke’s ideology, he still chooses to depend on inheritance, which is in part a
reflection of his elitism, but also largely a result of his skepticism.
As noted before, inheritance has remained the “uniform policy” of England for centuries, as
well as having the unique capability of “preservi[ng] a unity in so great a diversity” of the parts of
their constitution: the crown, peerage, House of Commons as well as the differing individual levels
of inheritance. As such, this is what first leads Burke to believe that the policy is “the result of
profound reflection.” However, Burke then corrects himself, and writes that it is actually not just a
result of reflection, but that it is “the happy effect of following nature.” This immediate change of
outlook is where we see his skeptical attitude. Inheritance has proven itself time and time again to
be the necessary component of political stability. So, this reflects to Burke that inheritance is a
natural order and one that can and should be depended on.
Due to this assumption of certainty, Burke reasons that the following of the natural order
results in the preservation of the state:
Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order
of the world and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body
composed of transitory parts, wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom,
molding together the great mysterious incorporation of the human race, the whole,
at one time, is never old or middle-aged or young, but, in a condition of
unchangeable constancy, moves on through the varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall,
renovation, and progression. [...] By adhering in this manner and on those
principles to our forefathers, we are guided not by the superstition of antiquarians,
but by the spirit of philosophic analogy.64
Inheritance establishes a political system where the structure itself is permanent, but those who
make up the structure differ. This political system, as it is maintained from inheritance, allows for
various wisdoms to enact upon the laws themself, as well as allowing for these laws to be
64
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continually incorporated and influenced by the people of England. In this way, we can see how
inheritance results in a political system that is “of unchangeable constancy” being that it creates a
foundation through a set structure, which allows for specific laws to go through “the varied tenor
of perpetual decay, fall, renovation, and progression” without any risk to the state itself. Again we
see that Burke's word choice of “unchangeable constancy” also reflects the certainty he prescribes
to anything which follows from the natural order. It is not enough for Burke to claim that the
political system is dependable, he takes a step further to claim that this dependability is
unwavering.
We also see in this passage that inheritance, aside from establishing a necessary foundation
for the preservation of the state, also serves to guide the present. When we “adher[e] in this
manner” we are guided “by the spirit of philosophical analogy” as opposed to “the superstition of
antiquarians.” For Burke, if we maintain tradition, we are able to use analogy to compare a present
situation to a past one in order to make an informed decision. But, without tradition, we are left to
conceive of every action, law, and structure as the result of something unknowable to us, thus
requiring our blind faith or “superstition.”
Through this analysis, an interesting paradox emerges from Burke’s skepticism. On the one
hand, Burke recognizes that the world around him is constantly changing, and thus he responds by
emphasizing the “unchangeable constancy” of the political system because it stems from an already
certain natural order. But, on the other hand, Burke is reluctant to conclude that any decision, aside
from the maintenance of a particular political structure, can be certain. Burke recognizes the limits
of what an individual can know, and so through comparison, we are able to make informed
decisions based on history, which leaves us with a better understanding than if we approached
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decisions in a vacuum. While the former still reflects a dependability that can and should go
unquestioned, the latter reflects something that demands questioning and comparison in order to
make decisions. With this understanding of what is driving Burke’s idea of inheritance, we can
now continue to see how this manifests in a political ideology that is against revolution, but still
prioritizes reform.
In much of Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke is doing comparative work
between England's history and the beginning of France's Revolution. Burke draws on two critical
periods in England's history - the Reformation and Revolution - when England was without a king
and “had lost the bond of union to their ancient edifice.” However, for him, what separates
England from France is that England did not “dissolve the whole fabric” of the constitution but
instead, “regenerated the deficient part of the old constitution through the parts which were not
impaired” whereas France has done the opposite and is attempting to organize the state “by the
organic moleculae of a disbanded people.”65 We can begin to see that for Burke, the maintenance
of inheritance is what allows for reform, not the destroying of it:
Besides, the people of England well know that the idea of inheritance furnishes a
sure principle of conservation and a sure principle of transmission, without at all
excluding a principle of improvement. It leaves acquisition free, but it secures what
it acquires. Whatever advantages are obtained by a state proceeding on these
maxims are locked fast as in a sort of family settlement, grasped as in a kind of
mortmain forever.66
Even though inheritance can be perceived as establishing a fixed system, Burke argues that it does
not “exclud[e] a principle of improvement.” He claims that while the idea of inheritance is upheld,
“acquisition [is left] free” so, even when the constitution is passed down, it still is able to be
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improved. When these “advantages are obtained by a state proceeding on these maxims” they are
“locked fast as in a sort of family settlement, grasped as in a kind of mortmain forever.” Even
though the use of “in a kind of mortmain forever” again reflects the idea of permanency, Burke
notes that reform is necessary. Aside from already claiming that England’s constitution had to
renew its “deficient” parts, he also points out that: “A state without the means of some change is
without the means of its conservation.”67 For Burke, inheritance provides necessary grounding
through the maintenance of political structure, so that one is able to have a foundation from which
they can not only receive guidance when making decisions, but also have stability in order to
explore and discover how to improve what no longer serves the people. As such, Burke’s criticism
of the French Revolution had little to do with the changes they wished to implement, but had
everything to do with the manner in which it was done.
During the early days of the French Revolution, King Louis XVI called a meeting of the
Estates-General, which was a representative assembly of the three orders of France: the clergy
(First Estate), the nobility (Second Estate), and the commoners (Third Estate). Prior to this meeting,
the representatives from each order wrote down a list of grievances to bring to the meeting of the
Estates-General, which took place on May 5th, 1789. However, during the meeting the orders
were immediately divided on how to call the voting system-either by head count or by estate.
While this issue occupied the estates for over a month, on June 17th the Third Estate decided to
break off and form the National Assembly, which threatened to proceed with or without the other
two orders. The king then decided to lock the National Assembly out of their meeting hall on June
20th, so the National Assembly took to the king’s tennis court and swore they would not leave
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until the new constitution was created. This protest resulted in the king forcing the other two orders
to join, forming the National Constituent Assembly.68 While the intention behind the formation of
the National Constituent Assembly was to be a movement towards equality, it actually resulted in
doing everything but that:
Believe me, sir, those who attempt to level, never equalize. In all societies,
consisting of various descriptions of citizens, some description must be uppermost.
The levelers, therefore, only change and pervert the natural order of things; they
load the edifice of society by setting up in the air what the solidity of the structure
requires to be on the ground.69
The National Constituent Assembly, as it was led by the Third Estate, just simply removed the
official label of the orders and thus “confound[ed] all sorts of citizens, as well as they could, into
one homogeneous mass.”70 For Burke, this was unnatural because in every society, there is
diversity among its citizens, and it is natural that some citizens will have an objectively more
important position than others; at some point, someone has to make the final decision. So, because
the Assembly tried to ignore this reality and acted as if every citizen was the same, they were left
with a complete inability to understand the changes France needed; they throw the strongest parts
of their social structures into the air when in reality, they are required to be on the ground.
While it might seem that Burke is again playing the laudator temporis acti in order to fault
any change that does not coincide with his certain order, what Burke really is concerned about is
the Assembly’s assertion of certainty:
They have some change in the church or state, or both, constantly in their view.
When that is the case, they are always bad citizens and perfectly unsure
connections. For, considering their speculative designs as of infinite value, and the
actual arrangement of the state as of no estimation, they are at best indifferent about
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it. They see no merit in the good, and no fault in the vicious management of public
affairs; they rather rejoice in the latter, as more propitious to revolution. They see no
merit or demerit in any man, or any action, or any political principle any further
than as they may forward or retard their design of change; they therefore take up,
one day, the most violent and stretched prerogative, and another time the wildest
democratic ideas of freedom, and pass from one to the other without any sort of
regard to cause, to person, or to party.71
For Burke, the natural order is undeniably dependable because it has been tested and proven over
time. The maintenance of this natural order is what allows for laws to be deliberated, adjusted, and
implemented by the “great mysterious incorporation of the human race.” Therefore, reform is
realizable only through adhering to this process and cannot be achieved through impulsivity. So,
being that the Assembly has “constantly in their view” the need to uproot this natural order, they
are regarded as “bad citizens” with “perfectly unsure connections.” While this claim is again
reflective of his own skepticism in that he is unwilling to accept anything that deviates from what
he knows to be true, he does also bring attention to an important tension between the potentiality
and the actuality of ideas, as shown in “Rousseau's Certainty: Equality in Theory and Practice.”
The Assembly, already having attempted to homogenize its citizens, continues to consider
their “speculative designs [to be of] infinite value” while remaining indifferent to the “actual
arrangement of the state.” They are so certain in their ideals that they fail to see the “merit or
demerit” of any man, action or political principle. There is no deliberation for they only consider
something long enough to see if it matches or goes against “their design of change.” The Assembly
asserts certainty on the basis of mere speculation without any grounding in reality, and this is what
is dangerous for Burke. He sees no contemplation, no moderation, and no diversity of thought just extremism and impulsivity, the result of which is political and social catastrophe:
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This was unnatural. The rest is in order. They have found their punishment in their
success: laws overturned; tribunals subverted; industry without vigor; commerce
expiring; the revenue unpaid, yet the people impoverished; a church pillaged, and a
state not relieved; civil and military anarchy made the constitution of the kingdom;
everything human and divine sacrificed to the idol of public credit, and national
bankruptcy the consequence;
The Assembly, because they acted against the natural order, now find, as if it is a logical
consequence, “their punishment in their success.” By overturning laws, they did away with the
justice process; by claiming men equal, they were left with little industry, no commerce, and still no
way to pay for public expenses. Churches pillaged, constitutions destroyed, everything “human
and divine sacrificed to the idol of public credit” while France became bankrupt and its people
remained poor.72 And as if this was not enough, Burke continues with the following:
and, to crown all, the paper securities of new, precarious, tottering power, the
discredited paper securities of impoverished fraud and beggared rapine, held out as
a currency for the support of an empire in lieu of the two great recognized species
that represent the lasting, conventional credit of mankind, which disappeared and
hid themselves in the earth from whence they came, when the principle of property,
whose creatures and representatives they are, was systematically subverted.73
The Assembly created a currency that was backed by the “impoverished fraud and beggared
rapine” of the church and state, which already “represented the lasting, conventional credit of
mankind.” But while the Assembly handed out this new currency and framed it as “support,” they
were unable to see the damage of their impulsivity. From this moment on, the very things which
could have saved France from ruin “disappeared and hid themselves in the earth from whence they
came.” Had the Assembly relied on the foundations of their political structure, perhaps they would
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have achieved the reform they so desperately desired but instead, they dissolved everything and as
such, were left only able to conceive of ideals, which ultimately destroyed France in the process.
Through this brief analysis of Burke, we are able to see that his skepticism veers toward an
anti-revolutionary attitude. However, this is not because he wants to protect the English oligarchy
nor is it because he desires to maintain oppression, but rather because he thinks that immediate
action precludes any possibility for improvement. As shown through Burke's account of the French
Revolution, we see that reform needs to be a gradual process - one which requires the foundations
established by inheritance to be maintained in order to be leaned on. Without these foundations, we
are guided by the uncertainty of suspicion and speculation; when these uncertainties are acted on
without contemplation and deliberation, we find ourselves believing we have made progress, but as
time carries on, realize we have actually regressed.
Perhaps revolution is not useful toward achieving larger goals such as equality, but it does
allow for agency and grants a voice to those who have not been heard. Furthermore, what happens
when a state needs to be structurally changed in order to move toward an ideal? If we take
inheritance seriously, this appears to not be a possibility because it would risk the collapse of the
state itself. Burke did predict the outcome of the French Revolution, and so, there must be validity
to his ideology; yet the consequence of his thinking remains a question. While gradual reform is
not difficult to withstand if you are an aristocrat, it means something entirely different to those who
are oppressed. We must examine under what terms an ideal can be realized and at one point, if any,
a balance can be struck between reform and revolution, for there is utility in both.
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Conclusion
The relationship between skepticism and certainty not only brought attention to the
complexity of these thinkers and the subtlety of their political positions, but it also complicated how
we view the skeptical narrative.
Descartes’ method propels an individual to question, explore, and investigate what can be
certain, but the expression of these findings are limited. The moment we enter into society, we are
expected to obey laws, custom, and authority because the risk of dismantling the social order from
the assertion of false certainty overrides the value of voicing any new, and perhaps uncertain, ideas
at all. The tension which emerges between the individual and the collective, as a result of the
individual’s skepticism, directs us to consider a wealth of questions: Does the prosperity of the state
always require the partial elimination of individual agency? If an individual is expected to be
politically subservient, what is the utility in otherwise maintaining a skeptical attitude? Does the
reserving of political opinions only to those in positions of power override the equal capacity and
right to reason of all individuals?
Rousseau’s longing for transparency as a way to reunite and equalize individuals is
contradicted throughout his own demonstration. In order for transparency to be realized, citizens
must be secretly reconditioned by the lawgiver through the general will. Does equality need to be
realized through blind habituation? The lawgiver's substantive role is that of a God and, as such, is
granted unchecked and unlimited authority. Why? Because this lawgiver is assumed to know how
to gear citizens toward social welfare. Is the granting of absolute power dangerous? Does it
inevitably lead to political certainty and is such certainty even possible? While Rousseau maintains
that the existence of the lawgiver is conceivable, what emerges from his work is the impossibility
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of such a being. This tension between the possibility of equality and the actuality of establishing
equality as demonstrated through the role of the lawgiver leads us to wonder whether such ideals
are achievable. Does the fictitious nature of the lawgiver suggest that equality in society is also
mere fiction?
Burke’s skepticism leads him, unlike Rousseau, to prioritize the actual and historical above
the theoretical or ideal. As a result, he concludes that inheritance is a natural and sure principle
because it has withstood the test of time. Inheritance is not only about unchanging constancy, but
every social and political structure which stems from it serves as a foundation that should be leaned
on during the inevitable unpredictability of change. But, we are left to ask: At what point does an
assertion of certainty become one of compliance? Not only do inherited customs guide us, but they
also ground us in our political and social realities so that when we make decisions, we act not from
the impulsivity of our ideals, but from a deep relationship with our personal and communal reality.
The question remains: Can reality ever be a certainty? What is it about an ideal that makes it
inevitably uncertain? From this uncertainty, it is not surprising that to Burke, reform cannot be
realized through revolutions, but only through the very maintenance of well-worn political
structures. If this is the case, what happens to those ideals that require the rearrangement of
particular political structures? Are some ideals more unattainable than others?
By investigating the relationship between skepticism and certainty in the work of
Descartes, Rousseau, and Burke, we have found that our understanding of these thinkers and their
politics has been complex, ultimately reflecting the larger question of the limits of certainty. The
question of certitude is one that cuts across time, space, and politics. It continues to emerge and
manifest itself in new ways, that not only speak to the centrality of the question for the history of
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political thought, but also to the responsibility we share in seeking an answer. Whether or not we
will ever discover the answer, the point is that we dared to try.
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